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Summary
It would be difficult for terrorists to mount a nuclear attack on a U.S. city, but
such an attack is plausible and would have catastrophic consequences, in one
scenario killing over a half-million people and causing damage of over $1 trillion.
Terrorists or rogue states might acquire a nuclear weapon in several ways.  The
nations of greatest concern as potential sources of weapons or fissile materials are
widely thought to be Russia and Pakistan.  Russia has many tactical nuclear weapons,
which tend to be lower in yield but more dispersed and apparently less secure than
strategic weapons.  It also has much highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons-
grade plutonium, some said to have inadequate security.  Many experts believe that
technically sophisticated terrorists could, without state support, fabricate a nuclear
bomb from HEU; opinion is divided on whether terrorists could make a bomb using
plutonium.  The fear regarding Pakistan is that some members of the armed forces
might covertly give a weapon to terrorists or that, if President Musharraf were
overthrown, an Islamic fundamentalist government or a state of chaos in Pakistan
might enable terrorists to obtain a weapon.  Terrorists might also obtain HEU from
the more than 130 research reactors worldwide that use HEU as fuel.
If terrorists acquired a nuclear weapon, they could use many means in an
attempt to bring it into the United States.  This nation has many thousands of miles
of land and sea borders, as well as several hundred ports of entry.  Terrorists might
smuggle a weapon across lightly-guarded stretches of borders, ship it in using a cargo
container, place it in a hold of a crude oil tanker, or bring it in using a truck, a boat,
or a small airplane.
The architecture of the U.S. response is termed “layered defense.”  The goal is
to try to block terrorists at various stages in their attempts to obtain a nuclear weapon
and smuggle it into the United States.  The underlying concept is that the probability
of success is higher if many layers are used rather than just one or two.  Layers
include threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union, efforts to secure HEU
worldwide, control of former Soviet and other borders, the Container Security
Initiative and Proliferation Security Initiative, and U.S. border security.  Several
approaches underlie multiple layers, such as technology, intelligence, and forensics.
Many policy options have been proposed to thwart or respond to nuclear
terrorism, such as developing new detection technologies, strengthening U.S.
intelligence capability, and improving planning to respond to an attack.  Congress
funds programs to counter nuclear terrorism and holds hearings and less-formal
briefings on the topic.  Many Members have introduced bills in this area.
This report is intended for background, not for tracking current developments.
It will be updated occasionally.  Radiological terrorism is a separate issue not covered
here; see CRS Report RS21766, Radiological Dispersal Devices: Select Issues in
Consequence Management, and CRS Report RS21528, Terrorist ‘Dirty Bombs’: A
Brief Primer.
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Nuclear Terrorism: A Brief Review of
Threats and Responses
Threats
It would be difficult for terrorists to attack a U.S. city using a nuclear weapon,
but such an attack is plausible and would have catastrophic consequences.  A report
of June 2004 by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States found that even though an attempt by al Qaeda in 1994 to purchase uranium
failed, “al Qaeda continues to pursue its strategic objective of obtaining a nuclear
weapon.”1  A book by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies emphasizes the
urgency of taking steps to reduce the risk that terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons
or materials.2  A May 2004 report by Harvard University’s Project on Managing the
Atom finds that a nuclear attack “would be among the most difficult types of attacks
for terrorists to accomplish,” but that with the necessary fissile materials, “a capable
and well-organized terrorist group plausibly could make, deliver, and detonate at
least a crude nuclear bomb capable of incinerating the heart of any major city in the
world.”3 An earlier report by the same group estimated the consequences of a ten-
kiloton weapon (two-thirds the yield of the Hiroshima bomb) detonated at Grand
Central Station in Manhattan as over a half-million people killed immediately,
hundreds of thousands injured, the possibility (depending on wind direction) of
having to evacuate all of Manhattan, much of lower Manhattan permanently
destroyed, direct costs of well over $1 trillion, indirect costs several times that, and
the prospect for nationwide panic and economic chaos if terrorists subsequently




6 National Academy of Sciences, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and
Technology in Countering Terrorism, Washington, National Academies Press, 2002, p. 45.
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provide detailed data on U.S. threat reduction programs and argue that there is an
urgent need to accelerate these programs.
This report divides the threat into two aspects, the acquisition of a bomb and its
delivery to a target.  The former could involve acquisition of a nuclear weapon, or
acquisition of fissile material and its subsequent fabrication into a bomb.  Delivery
involves a different, much less sophisticated, and much more common set of skills
needed to move the weapon covertly by stages toward its target.
Weapon Acquisition
Experts have raised concerns that terrorists might try to acquire two types of
nuclear weapons.  In the simplest, a “gun-type” weapon, a mass of uranium highly
enriched in the fissile isotope 235 (highly enriched uranium, or HEU) is shot down
a tube (resembling an artillery tube) into another HEU mass, creating a supercritical
mass and a nuclear explosion.  The Hiroshima bomb used this approach; its designers
had such high confidence in it that they did not test this type of weapon prior to using
it.  The second type, an implosion weapon, typically uses weapons-grade plutonium
(WGPU, composed mainly of the isotope 239).  A shell of WGPU is surrounded by
chemical explosives arrayed to produce a symmetrical inward-moving (implosion)
shock wave that compresses the plutonium enough to be supercritical.  The Nagasaki
bomb was of this type.  It is much more complex in design and manufacture than a
gun-assembly weapon.  An implosion device was tested in New Mexico prior to use
on Nagasaki.  A National Academy of Sciences report asserts, “Crude HEU weapons
could be fabricated without state assistance.”6  Some experts believe that terrorists
could create an implosion weapon;7 others disagree.8
Terrorists or rogue states might acquire nuclear weapons or fissile materials in
various ways.  The source of greatest concern is Russia.9  It has much fissile material.
A National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) document shows that
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considerable work remains for the disposition of this material,10 and a National
Academy of Sciences report states that the risk of diversion of special nuclear
material (SNM, or fissile material)  from Russia is “high” because “large inventories
of SNM are stored at many sites that apparently lack inventory controls, and
indigenous threats have increased.”11
A related concern is that Pakistan might be the source of nuclear weapons or
materials for terrorists under several scenarios: (1) Islamists in the armed services
might provide such assistance covertly under the current government; (2) if that
government were overthrown by  fundamentalists, the new government might make
weapons available to terrorists; or (3) such weapons might become available if chaos,
rather than a government, followed the overthrow.
Other nations are seeking nuclear weapons.  According to press reports, Iran has
a program to produce HEU, North Korea has reprocessed WGPU from spent nuclear
fuel, and “there is little disagreement inside the [U.S.] government over the
intelligence indicating North Korea has been secretly building uranium enrichment
capability in violation of the 1994 accord.”12  The prospect that some nations might
provide such materials to other states or to terrorists is a source of concern.  A.Q.
Khan, the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, ran a covert operation for many years
that reportedly provided Libya, North Korea, and Iran with equipment for making
HEU and plans for making an atomic bomb.13  Such nations might use these weapons
themselves, or leak or sell weapons, material, or expertise to terrorist groups.
Nuclear research reactors offer still another route to obtaining a weapon.
Securing the Bomb states, “More than 130 research reactors still use HEU as their
fuel, in more than 40 countries.  Most of these facilities have very modest security
— in many cases, no more than a night watchman and a chain-link fence.”14  A more
recent Government Accountability Office report stated that as of July 30, 2004, “39
of the 105 research reactors targeted by DOE [for conversion from HEU to low-
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enriched uranium, or LEU] have converted to LEU fuel.”15  Six of these reactors are
reportedly on U.S. university campuses.16
A gun-assembly weapon need not be particularly large.  The Hiroshima bomb,
according to one source, weighed 8,900 pounds and was 10 feet long and 28 inches
in diameter.17  Much of that size and weight, however, was taken up by an armored
steel shell and stabilizing fins, as well as by arming, fuzing, and firing devices.18  The
gun barrel — the actual nuclear explosive device — measured 6 feet in length by
over 6 inches in diameter and weighed about a half-ton.19  Simple improvements
might shrink size and weight.  A terrorist-made implosion weapon or a weapon stolen
from a nation’s arsenal could be smaller.  In short, a weapon could fit in a car, boat,
or small airplane, and would occupy a small corner of a shipping container.
Weapon Delivery
The United States has many thousands of miles of land and water borders, as
well as several hundred sea, land, and air ports of entry — 317 by one count —
giving terrorists many pathways to smuggle a nuclear bomb into this nation.20  There
are many types of borders, as the following table shows — oceans (tropical to
temperate to Arctic), land and river borders with Mexico and Canada, and the Great
Lakes.  Each poses its own set of opportunities for smugglers.
Legal and illegal crossings into the United States also present terrorists with
different risks and opportunities.  Legal crossings are points, such as seaports,
airports, and border stations on roads entering the United States.  Illegal crossings are
lines — the thousands of miles of unguarded stretches of coasts and land borders.
Securing points poses different requirements from securing lines.  Points have an
immense volume of traffic, almost all of it legal, and a corresponding concentration
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of people and resources of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).  The task of
CBP is to find the needle in the haystack while expediting legal traffic.  Attempts to
smuggle a nuclear weapon through a legal crossing would run the risk that the
weapon might be detected by computerized screening of cargo manifests, imaging
devices (similar to x-rays), neutron activation devices, or physical inspection, as
discussed below. That risk is reduced by the need for CBP agents to process huge
numbers of vehicles, vessels, and passengers, leaving little time or attention for those
not raising suspicions, and by the low radioactivity of fissile uranium-235 —
approximately one hundred-millionth that of radioactive material that might be used
in a “dirty bomb.”21
Length of U.S. Borders (miles)
Alaska coast 6,640 Atlantic coast 2,069
Hawaii coast 750 Great Lakes 970
Pacific coast excluding
Alaska and Hawaii
1,293 Alaska-Canada border 1,538




Gulf of Mexico coast 1,631 Total 19,841
Source: The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1998.  Mahwah, NJ, World Almanac Books, 1997.
World Book page and source for each border segment are as follows: U.S. coasts, p. 541, U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Great Lakes, p. 598,
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Ocean Service; border with Canada excluding Alaska and
Great Lakes, p.543, Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, and p. 598, U.S. Department
of Commerce, National Ocean Service; Alaska-Canada border, p. 543, no source given; and U.S.-
Mexico border, p. 543, listed as “approximately,” referenced to 1963 boundary agreement.  Note that
measurements of the U.S. coasts vary sharply, depending on such things as the length of the
“yardstick” used and  how far up inlets and rivers the seacoast is measured.  See also CRS Report
RS21729, U.S. International Borders: Brief Facts, by Marilyn Nelson and Barbara Salazar Torreon.
CBP resources are spread much more thinly along lines.  Attempts to smuggle
a nuclear weapon across an unguarded section of border would avoid the risk that the
weapon might be detected, but CBP agents would only need to detect the smugglers,
not the weapon: anyone or anything entering the United States across lines is illegal.
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On the other hand, risk to smugglers is reduced because CBP faces an immense task
in patrolling the vast stretches of borders.22
Terrorists could avoid the risks attendant to smuggling across both points and
lines if they could place a weapon on board an airplane or ship bound for the United
States and detonate it before it could be inspected, such as in the air above a city or
as it entered a seaport.
Scenarios for smuggling a nuclear weapon across unguarded coasts or borders
are similar to those for smuggling bales of marijuana, many of which are reportedly
flown in, brought by small boats, or carried across land borders; the difficulty of
patrolling the borders makes such scenarios feasible.  A key difference between
smuggling marijuana and a nuclear weapon is that in the former case, losses due to
interception by CBP are expected and are viewed as a cost of doing business.
Terrorists attempting to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the United States, in contrast,
would presumably have only one or a few weapons and would have to go to great
lengths to succeed.  Conversely, because of the great value of a nuclear weapon to
terrorists, methods that create a substantial probability of detecting an attempt to
smuggle a weapon into the United States might deter such an attempt.
Another scenario commonly discussed is smuggling a nuclear weapon in a
shipping container.23  These metal boxes, typically 8 by 8 by 20 feet or 8 by 8 by 40
feet, are used to transport vast quantities of goods ranging from clothes to computers
to automobile engines.  Some 7 million containers enter the United States by ship
each year;24 container ships may carry several thousand containers.  From seaports,
they are transported by truck or rail throughout the country.  The concern is that if
terrorists could place a bomb in a container overseas, they could ship it into the
United States and transport it anywhere in the country.  Under the Container Security
Initiative (CSI), discussed below, CBP agents and their foreign counterparts screen
containers being loaded onto container ships at certain foreign ports, and the foreign
agents inspect containers that the screening identifies as suspicious, based on ports
of call, manifest data, shipping company, etc. Terrorists, however, might try to
circumvent CSI by acquiring a trusted shipping company to avoid suspicion,
falsifying manifest data, infiltrating CSI ports, shipping from non-CSI ports.  A
nuclear explosion in a U.S. port from a bomb in a shipping container would have not
only direct effects, but could also have far-reaching effects on the world economy
because of its dependence on container traffic, an effect magnified by industry’s use
of “just-in-time” deliveries. According to Robert Bonner, Commissioner of Customs
and Border Protection,
Simply put, the shipping of sea containers would stop. The American people, for
one, would not likely permit one more sea container to enter the United States
until there was a significantly greater assurance — such as 100% inspections —
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from Terrorism, New York, HarperCollins, 2004, p. 81, 83.
27 U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Information Agency. “Table 3.7: United States — Oil
Imports (Most Recent 12 Months)” for May 2003-April 2004.  Available at [http://
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97,000 tons.  U.S.  Navy.  “Fact File: Aircraft Carriers — CV, CVN,” updated January 14,
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30 Mark Huber, Tanker Operations: A Handbook for the Person-in-Charge (PIC), fourth
edition.  Centreville, MD, Cornell Maritime Press, 2001, p. 20.
that no additional terrorist weapons would be smuggled into the country.
Governments in other major industrial countries would no doubt adopt a similar
policy, thus bringing the global economy to its knees.25
Stephen Flynn, an authority on U.S. vulnerabilities to terrorist attack, cites John
Meredith, group managing director of Hutchison Port Holdings, which Flynn
describes as “the world’s largest [port] terminal operator,” as “worried about the
cascading consequences ... should the U.S. government close its ports for two to three
weeks [after a terrorist attack], Meredith warned, the entire system would go into
gridlock.”26
Another possible scenario is the use of an oil tanker to transport a nuclear
weapon.  The Middle East is the dominant source of anti-American terrorism, the
United States imports an average of more than 2 million barrels of crude oil a day
from Persian Gulf nations,27 this crude oil is transported by ship, and it would be very
difficult to detect a bomb inside a supertanker.
Part of the difficulty of detecting a bomb inside a floating vat of crude oil would
arise from the sheer size of supertankers, which carry 100,000 deadweight tons or
more of crude oil.28  For example, two supertankers built in 2003 for COSCO (China
Ocean Shipping) Group were 330 meters (almost a quarter-mile) long and 60 meters
in beam, and had a capacity of about 300,000 deadweight tons.29  There are even
larger tankers that carry 500,000 deadweight tons of crude oil, and have a length of
396 meters and a beam of 71 meters.30  On land, some detection devices use gamma
rays (high-energy x-rays) to peer inside a shipping container and create an x-ray-type
image, but the size of a supertanker and the thickness of the steel (especially with the
use of double hulls) make this technique unworkable.  Another possible means of
detecting a nuclear weapon is neutron activation, in which a burst of neutrons is sent
into the item to be examined, such as a shipping container; neutrons that strike
CRS-8
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uranium-235 (or other radioactive material) will cause some atoms to fission,
releasing neutrons and gamma rays.  Any neutron coming back as a result of neutron
bombardment would be suspicious.  The gamma rays produced by the disintegration
of each isotope have a unique set of energies, creating a “fingerprint” that permits
identification of the isotope.  However, neutrons sent into the oil and any produced
by fissioning of uranium would be absorbed (forming deuterium or tritium) or
scattered by the hydrogen atoms in crude oil, and the large volume of oil would
attenuate any gamma rays produced, defeating this form of detection.  At the same
time, designing a means to detonate a bomb inside a tanker could prove a technical
challenge for terrorists.
A bomb in a tanker could devastate an oil port by the blast and by secondary
fires in nearby refineries and oil storage tanks.  A tanker bomb might be used against
other maritime targets, such as the Panama Canal.  And if a bomb in a shipping
container could lead to the shutdown of container traffic, seriously damaging the
world economy, a tanker bomb might by the same token lead to the suspension of
crude oil shipments, with similar results.
Responses
At this point, three years after the attacks of September 11, the components of
the U.S. and global response have become clearer.  The response is often termed
“layered defense,” reflecting the idea that terrorists would have to proceed through
many steps to acquire a nuclear weapon and smuggle it into the United States, and
that attempting to thwart them at each step has a higher likelihood of success than
trying to block one step only.31  Whether layered defense is an overarching strategy,
as is the case in ballistic missile defense, or simply a name given to what would have
happened anyway as many agencies with different capabilities contribute in the ways
each is able to, or some of both, is another matter.  In any event, many programs have
been established to deal with nuclear terrorism since 9/11, and others created well
before then have acquired new urgency.  The following six categories of programs
are presented in the order in which they bear on a terrorist or rogue state effort to
acquire and deliver a nuclear weapon.
Threat Reduction Programs in the Former Soviet Union.  The Soviet
Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-226, Title II), also known as the
Nunn-Lugar Amendment, authorized a Department of Defense (DOD) program to
assist in the destruction of Soviet nuclear and other weapons.  The United States now
funds threat reduction and nonproliferation programs through three agencies: DOD
runs the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to secure and dismantle former
Soviet nuclear and other weapons; the Department of Energy (DOE) runs several
programs within its Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account, such as International
Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation and Elimination of Weapons-Grade
Plutonium Production, to secure nuclear weapons materials and knowledge; and the
Department of State runs such programs as Science and Technology Centers in
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Russia and Ukraine to provide weapons scientists with grant funding or employment
on nonweapons projects.32
Efforts To Secure HEU Worldwide.  HEU is used in many research
reactors around the world.  The United States and the Soviet Union provided this
material to many nations years ago.  As noted above, much is said to be poorly
guarded.  It is a concern because acquiring a suitable quantity of HEU would be the
most difficult step for terrorists intent on making a nuclear bomb.  Efforts to secure
some of this material have been ad hoc rather than part of a comprehensive plan.  For
example, in 1994 Project Sapphire reportedly removed from a “poorly guarded
warehouse” in Kazakhstan enough HEU to make 20-50 nuclear weapons and brought
it to the United States.33  In August 2002, Project Vinca reportedly removed enough
HEU for two nuclear weapons from a research reactor in Serbia and flew it to Russia,
where it had originated.34   Securing the Bomb asserts that the pace of securing fissile
material has slowed since September 11, 2001, and suggests a “global cleanout” of
HEU.35  On May 26, 2004, responding to such concerns, Secretary of Energy Spencer
Abraham announced a new Global Threat Reduction Initiative to secure Russian-
origin fresh HEU by the end of 2005; to secure spent fuel of Russian/Soviet origin
by 2010, and of U.S. origin within a decade; to convert the cores of civilian research
reactors using HEU to be able to use uranium with a concentration of uranium-235
too low to be used in a nuclear weapon, and to try to identify and secure other nuclear
and radiological materials that may pose a threat.36  For this effort, Secretary
Abraham said, the United States plans to dedicate more than $450 million.  Other
DOE personnel indicated that sum is the approximate cost to complete the program,
that the funds would probably be spent over more than 10 years, and that most of the
funds would be for already-existing programs.37
There are also concerns about the security of any Iranian and North Korean
HEU, as discussed above, and Pakistani HEU.  A discussion of diplomatic efforts to
secure such material goes beyond the scope of this report.38
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Control of Former Soviet and Other Borders.  While some programs
discussed earlier seek to secure former Soviet nuclear weapons and fissile materials,
DOE’s Second Line of Defense (SLD) and the State Department’s Export Control
and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program provide assistance to
Russia and other countries to prevent nuclear materials from being smuggled out
through their borders. DOE states that SLD “deploys radiation detection monitors at
strategic transit and border crossings and at air and sea transshipment hubs.”39
Container Security Initiative.  CSI was started in January 2002 by the
former U.S. Customs Service, now a part of CBP in the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).40  Shipping containers account for 90 percent of all world cargo;
some 7 million are offloaded in U.S. seaports annually.  Terrorists might attempt to
ship a nuclear weapon to a U.S. port in a container and detonate it before the
container was inspected.  Accordingly, CSI screens containers in overseas ports
before they are loaded onto U.S.-bound ships. CSI was operational in 18 ports as of
March 2004, with another 20 in earlier stages of CSI implementation.  Participating
ports have U.S. CBP agents who work with host country officers to decide which
containers to target for inspection; host country officers inspect suspicious containers
using non-intrusive inspection devices such as gamma-ray imaging machines or using
physical inspection.  A portion of DOE’s SLD program, Mega-Ports, supports CSI
by equipping some foreign seaports that are part of CSI with radiation detection
equipment, and providing the necessary training, to “screen cargo for nuclear and
radioactive materials that could be used in a weapon of mass destruction or a RDD
(dirty bomb) ...”41
Proliferation Security Initiative.  PSI began in May 2003; by August 2004,
16 nations had joined.42  The participants seek to interdict sea or air shipments of
WMD or WMD-related materials to or by states “of proliferation concern” trying to
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acquire or transfer such items.  Shipments could be interdicted at ports, in territorial
waters, on the high seas, or in national airspace.  According to press reports, the first
interdiction under PSI was of the German ship BBC China in October 2003; the
seizure of its Libya-bound cargo, thousands of parts for special centrifuges of value
for enriching uranium, may have been influential in convincing Libya to abandon its
WMD programs.43
U.S. Border Security.  The final line of defense tries to keep terrorists from
smuggling a nuclear weapon across U.S. borders.  It involves border patrols, barriers,
remote sensors, radiation monitors, Customs inspections, seaport security, and the
like, generally within the purview of CBP.  Yet as noted in “Weapon Delivery,”
above, there are great difficulties in securing the many “points” through which people
and goods may enter legally, and the thousands of miles of “lines,” thinly-guarded
stretches of coasts and land borders across which entry is illegal.  These difficulties
illustrate the importance of the other defensive layers noted earlier in this section and
show why it would be unwise to rely solely on border security.
Supporting Capabilities.  Technology, intelligence, and forensics cut across
and support the foregoing steps to keep terrorists or rogue states from acquiring and
delivering a nuclear weapon.
Technology Development.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-
296, Sec. 302) makes the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology
responsible for “coordinating the Federal Government’s civilian efforts to identify
and develop countermeasures to” terrorist WMD threats.  DHS is charged with
coordinating efforts by many agencies, including DOE’s National Nuclear Security
Administration and the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards
and Technology, to develop technology for homeland security.  DHS has proposed
various technology programs for FY2005.44  U.S. national laboratories (including the
three nuclear weapons labs, Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia), U.S. and foreign
corporations, universities, and others have been conducting R&D for new
technologies to detect smuggling of nuclear materials and weapons.  Detection of
HEU and WGPU is difficult because, as noted, they are not highly radioactive.
Various technologies are in use,45 such as radiation portal monitors, which passively
detect radiation emitted by a source,46 and active imaging systems, like the Vehicle
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and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS), which operate like x-ray machines.47  More
advanced systems are being developed.  For example, Livermore is developing a
neutron-interrogation system to screen containers. It bombards a container with
neutrons, producing nuclear fissions in such material as HEU and WGPU.48  The
fissions produce gamma rays with specific energy levels unique to each substance,
permitting identification.  Detecting illegal movement across U.S. borders, in
contrast, does not require detecting fissile material; relevant technologies include
surveillance sensors and data analysis software.49
Intelligence.  The possibility that terrorists could evade any of the layers
described above necessitates an enhanced intelligence capability to complement other
means of detecting movement of nuclear materials and warheads.  Such a capability
could also focus the efforts of particular defenses, whether alerting a Russian facility
that a smuggling plan was in the works or indicating that a particular cargo container
might hold a nuclear weapon.  Improving and organizing intelligence for  homeland
security have been sharply debated.50
Nuclear Forensics.  The ability to glean information from nuclear weapon
debris and other radioactive material lies at the intersection of technology and
intelligence.  During the Cold War, the United States obtained much information by
analyzing fallout from Soviet nuclear weapon tests.  For example, analysis confirmed
that the Soviet Union had conducted its first atomic bomb test, and analysis of fallout
from the first Soviet hydrogen bomb test revealed many details about that weapon’s
design.51  Even minute samples are of value.52  With the current moratorium on
nuclear testing, forensic studies are applied to verifying the safety of U.S. nuclear
warheads, detecting signs of nuclear proliferation, and thwarting illicit trafficking of
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to identify the nation that originated the fissile material or weapon, and determine
whether terrorists had fabricated the weapon on their own or obtained it from a
nation’s stockpile.  This information would aid efforts to prevent further leakage. The
ability to attribute a weapon or material to a nation might also deter a nation from
providing such items to terrorists by holding the prospect of a military response.
Further, if a terrorist nuclear weapon were found, forensic analysis could contribute
to an understanding of the weapon’s design, which could help determine whether it
could be moved and how best to disable it.
Other issues that bear on nuclear terrorism include missile defense, export
controls, and nuclear nonproliferation efforts more generally.  Many organizations
and other groups are involved, such as the U.N., the International Atomic Energy
Agency, and the Group of Eight.54
Options and Implications for U.S. Policy
In combating nuclear terrorism, the standard for success for the United States
is daunting — zero nuclear detonations, which may require stopping every terrorist
or rogue state attempt to acquire and deliver a nuclear weapon — while a single
nuclear detonation in the United States would constitute a terrorist success.
Measured against that binary standard, it is impossible to determine the extent to
which, or even if, the initiatives discussed above have increased U.S. security.
Nonetheless, studies have shown many potential weaknesses in U.S. ability to
thwart nuclear terrorism.  The main response of policymakers has been to strengthen,
consolidate, coordinate, or initiate a wide array of programs.  A Government
Accountability Office report, for example, notes a number of recommendations that
it and congressionally chartered commissions have made for defending against
catastrophic threats.55  Categories of recommendations include
! “Enhanced or clarified federal or state authority to manage a terrorist
incident involving Weapons of Mass Destruction”
! “Improvements to incident planning, management, and response
capabilities for dealing with a WMD terrorist incident”
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! “Better management and more resources for research and
development of technologies to prevent or respond to terrorist WMD
incidents” and
! “Laws, cooperative agreements, and regulatory regimes to better
control the precursors to WMD.”
Many policy options are available to counter nuclear terrorism, including (1)
accelerate the safeguarding of Russian fissile materials; (2) broaden that effort to a
global cleanout of HEU, such as at research reactors; (3) expand CSI to more ports;
(4) strengthen the Coast Guard, such as through its Integrated Deepwater Systems
program, which would, among other things, improve its ability to conduct
interdictions for PSI;56 (5) develop new detection technologies, such as the neutron
interrogation system; (6) strengthen capabilities to detect and disable terrorist nuclear
devices, such as Nuclear Incident Response Teams of DOE and the Environmental
Protection Agency; and (7) strengthen U.S. intelligence capability.  Two books
released in the summer of 2004 provide detailed policy options.57
Role of Congress
Congress funds programs to counter nuclear terrorism through several
authorization and appropriations bills.  The annual National Defense Authorization
and Department of Defense Appropriations Acts fund DOD Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs; the annual National Defense Authorization and Energy and
Water Development Appropriations Acts fund DOE Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation and nuclear weapons programs.  The annual Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Acts fund the DHS Directorate of Science and
Technology; for FY2005, the authorizing bills for that directorate are H.R. 4141 and
S. 2295, Border Infrastructure and Technology Integration Act of 2004.  Other
agencies, funded by other bills, also conduct R&D.  The FY2005 requests for
Cooperative Threat Reduction, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and DHS
Directorate of Science and Technology are $409.2 million, $1,348.6 million, and
$1,039 million, respectively.  Congress also holds oversight hearings, establishes
specific legislative requirements and restrictions on programs, and calls public
attention to these issues.
Other bills introduced in the 108th Congress that bear on nuclear terrorism
include the following.  All show the latest major action as of September 15, 2004.
H.R. 795 (Deutsch). Would amend the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to
require the Secretary of Energy to develop a plan to decrease the threat resulting from
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the theft or diversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU).  The plan would provide,
as appropriate, for monitoring HEU supplies at certain companies, assisting those
companies with security measures, accelerating the blend-down of HEU to low
enriched uranium, purchasing HEU, etc.  Referred to House Energy and Commerce
Committee on February 13, 2003, and to that committee’s Subcommittee on Energy
and Air Quality on March 17, 2003.
H.R. 1010 (Nadler).  Port Protection Act of 2003.  Would amend title 46,
United States Code, to require inspection of cargo destined for the United States.
The bill would require, effective January 1, 2005:  inspection outside the United
States of all U.S.-bound cargo containers; inspection of all noncontainerized cargo
entering by means other than a vessel or airplane to verify that it is not carrying a
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon; and physical inspection of each U.S.-bound
cargo vessel at least 200 miles from the United States to ensure that containers have
not been tampered with and that the vessel itself is not carrying a chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapon.  Referred to the House Select Committee on
Homeland Security, the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’s
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, and on March 17, 2003,
to the House Ways and Means Committee’s Subcommittee on Trade.
H.R. 1389 (Crowley).  Homeland Emergency Response Act of 2003.  Finds,
among other things, that “[a] new, long-term grant program by the Federal
Government needs to be established to enhance the ability of first responders to
respond to incidents of terrorism, including weapons of mass destruction, such as
biological, chemical and nuclear attacks,” directs the Secretary of Homeland Security
to establish such a program, and provides details on this program.  Referred to the
House Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security, May 5, 2003.
H.R. 3173 (Nadler).  To provide for the purchase by the Secretary of Energy
of excess Russian plutonium and highly enriched uranium.  Referred to the House
Committee on International Relations, September 24, 2003.
H.R. 4212 (Schiff).  A bill to promote U.S. security by facilitating the removal
of potential nuclear weapons materials from vulnerable sites around the world.
Would establish within DOE a Task Force on Nuclear Material Removal “to ensure
that potential nuclear weapons materials are entirely removed from the most
vulnerable sites around the world as soon as practicable.”  Referred to House
Committee on International Relations on April 22, 2004.  (S. 2310 is a related bill.)
H.R. 4965 (Lantos).  Nuclear Black-Market Elimination Act.  Would “impose
sanctions on foreign entities that engage in certain nuclear proliferation activities.”
Referred to the House Committee on International Relations, July 22, 2004.
S. 6 (Daschle).  Comprehensive Homeland Security Act of 2003:  Title IX,
Weapons of Mass Destruction, would provide assistance for the International Atomic
Energy Agency to improve safeguards at nuclear facilities abroad and to counter
nuclear terrorism; strengthen border security, export controls, and nonproliferation
programs in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere; accelerate the program for the
disposition of Russian HEU; develop a program with Russia to secure or dismantle
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Russian tactical nuclear weapons; and permit Cooperative Threat Reduction funds
to be used outside the former Soviet Union.  Referred to Senate Judiciary Committee
on January 7, 2003.
S. 1147 (Boxer).  High-Tech Port Security Act of 2003.  Under this act, the
Secretary of Homeland Security would establish standards for certifying equipment
to screen cargo containers for radioactive and explosive material; require “every
cargo container carried by a vessel entering the United States [to] be screened for
radioactive and explosive materials before the container leaves the port”; require all
cargo containers entering the United States to be blast resistant; and ensure (including
by providing grants to ports) that the 20 largest U.S. ports and other highly vulnerable
U.S. ports (and later other ports) have deployed screening equipment.  Referred to
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on May 23, 2003.
S. 2279 (Hollings).  Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2004.  Among
other things, the measure directs DHS to conduct R&D to strengthen port security,
such as on equipment to detect nuclear or radiological material.  Measure reported
from the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (S.Rept. 108-
274) on May 20, 2004, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and placed
on the Senate Legislative Calendar.
S. 2310 (Feinstein).  A bill to promote U.S. security by facilitating the removal
of potential nuclear weapons materials from vulnerable sites around the world.
Would establish within DOE a Task Force on Nuclear Material Removal “to ensure
that potential nuclear weapons materials are entirely removed from the most
vulnerable sites around the world as soon as practicable.”  Referred to Senate
Committee on Armed Services on April 8, 2004.  (H.R. 4212 is a related bill.)
